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ABSTRACT
Th e aim of this article is to present a critical overview of research methods (so 
called indexes) used for measuring diff erent parameters of party systems. Th e 
starting point for further discussion is the semantic relevance theory developed by 
G. Sartori. In the next part of the article I will deal with the question whether this 
qualitative method can be quantifi ed in any way. With this regard, I will analyse 
such indexes as: the eff ective number of parties index, the power indexes and the 
government relevance indexes. Th e article shows that despite many scholars’ fears, 
political science has a large set of tools for making precise measurements of 
empirical data, which may be used for comparison. A theoretical concept of rel-
evance, together with its “qualitative” test, combined with properly selected and 
confi gured quantitative techniques, guarantee the eff ective measurement of rele-
vance also at the ordinal, or even the interval level. Th us, it is legitimate to refer to 
this approach as an “index method.”
Keywords: political relevance, eff ective number of parties, power indexes, 
indexes of government relevance, index method.
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POLITICAL RELEVANCE AS a political science category was introduced in 1976 by 
an Italian researcher Giovanni Sartori when he discussed the usefulness and 
eff ectiveness of the classifi cation of political parties based on the quantitative cri-
terion.1 Since that time political relevance has become one of the most important 
issues in the theory of parties and party systems. To put it briefl y, it might be said 
that relevance is a quality specifi c to some political parties, thanks to which they 
occupy a special position within a complex and multi-level structure of inter-party 
relations called a party system. Th is special position consists in having the possibil-
ity of shaping these relations and, consequently, guiding the development of the 
whole system. A relevant party is the one, the existence and political activity of 
which is important not only for itself, but also, and particularly, for the other 
participants of the inter-party competition.2 In other words, its presence aff ects the 
functioning of the party system as a whole. Th us, it determines its structure, which 
has the direct signifi cance for the correct classifi cation of a given party system and 
registering its reconfi gurations.
Even superfi cial observations of the political reality lead us to the conclusion 
that political parties, even those having relevance, diff er in weight and the degree 
of their infl uence on the political system. Hence, we should not treat them equal-
ly.3 Two issues arise here. First, we need to identify which parties are relevant; 
second, how relevant they are. Using Sartori’s words, How many? (how many 
relevant parties are there? – BM’s note) is related to the question how strong? […], 
how strong must a party be to become relevant and to what extent does the lack 
of strength make a party irrelevant?4 Th us, we are facing a problem of measuring 
relevance, which has only partly been solved by Sartori. Th e system of “counting” 
political parties he proposed, sometimes referred to as the “relevance test” in the 
literature on the subject, makes it possible to distinguish the key parties in the 
political system from those which constitute the background of the political 
competition.5 In this way we obtain important information about the parties 
1 See: G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Wivenhoe Park 2005, pp. 
105 – 110.
2 B. Michalak, Czy partie polityczne można liczyć, czyli o problemie relewancji politycznej, “Dialogi 
Polityczne” 2008, no. 1, pp. 232 –23 3.
3 G. Sartori, op.cit., p. 281.
4 Ibidem, p. 107.
5 To put it shortly, according with the “counting rules,” the relevant parties are those which, ir-
respective of their size, will be able to infl uence at least one potential ruling coalition (the fi rst rule 
regarding the existence of a given party’s coalition potential). Moreover, a relevant party is the one 
which, although it is not regarded as a potential coalition partner, is able to infl uence the models of 
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which exceeded the barrier of representation. However, this knowledge will be 
mostly “quantitative,” as the criteria for the evaluation of relevance proposed by 
Sartori are based more on the variable of a party’s “size,” and less on the ideo-
logical diff erences between parties. Th e test treats all parties which are relevant to 
the system in the same way and it does not hierarchize them. Although it may 
help us to diff erentiate parties on the basis of the fact whether they are relevant 
or not, we cannot do it on the basis of the strength of their relevance. Th us, Sar-
tori’s proposal makes it possible for us to measure the level of relevance at the 
semantic level, but not at the ordinal one.6 Sartori counts relevant parties without 
diff erentiating their weight, depending on whether we deal with a party which is 
highly relevant to the system or whether its relevance is of marginal importance, 
which may cause diffi  culties in assessing it. Ultimately, some small centre parties 
(in the science of political parties referred to as “pivot” parties) are much more 
important, with regard to the formation of a coalition or other political goals, than 
large extreme parties, which have high potential of political blackmail.7 It seems 
that Sartori understood it himself as he introduced additional diff erentiation 
criteria for parties with coalition potential.8 Th erefore, the level of a party’s rele-
vance depends on whether it is currently part of the government or whether it 
only has the potential for governing. Only in the former case does this party have 
government relevance.
Comparative political science has developed a lot of specialist measurement 
tools based on quantitative techniques – so-called indexes. Th ey are particularly 
useful in comparative research, in which they help to make objective comparisons 
and make it possible to precisely establish similarities and diff erences between 
analysed objects. All this may be presented in the form of measurable quantities, 
which enable us to identify the size of diff erentiation and to grasp the moment of 
a political change. Th us, it seems that the quantitative approach would be particu-
interaction, the direction of competition, the nature of alliances, etc. existing among the other relevant 
parties. (the second principle concerning the use of political blackmail). See: G. Sartori, op.cit., p. 108; 
for more details see: R. Herbut, Systemy partyjne w Europie Zachodniej – ciągłość i zmiana. Studium 
porównawcze, Wrocław 1996, pp. 167 –1 79; A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Demokracje zachodnioeu-
ropejskie. Analiza porównawcza, Wrocław 1997, pp. 137 – 41; B. Michalak, Czy…, pp. 232 – 241; 
B. Michalak, Partie protestu w Europie Zachodniej. Analiza relewancji politycznej, Toruń 2008: 
68 – 80.
6 A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, op.cit., p. 139; B. Michalak, Czy…, p. 239.
7 R. Taagepera, Predicting Party Sizes. Th e Logic of Simple Electoral Systems, Oxford 2007, p. 63.
8 See: G. Sartori, op.cit., pp.  267 – 268.
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larly useful for measuring the relevance of political parties, especially as regards 
its strength.9
However, our analysis so far, although it could not be very thorough, clearly 
shows that political relevance is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. 
Hence, we must be aware that any attempt at fi nding a specifi c relevance index is 
doomed to failure. Aft er all, the author of this category himself formulated two 
principles of the semantic measurement of relevance depending on whether the 
party under analysis supports or opposes the political system in which it functions. 
Th at is why, instead of looking for a universal algorithm of relevance, it would be 
more justifi ed to propose a certain way of operationalizing this phenomenon with 
the use of well-known and well-tried tools and methods of measuring party sys-
tems. If we properly select and correlate them, construct adequate measurement 
scales and interpret correctly the information obtained on this basis, we will be 
able to propose a complex method of the identifi cation and measurement of 
political relevance. In the next part of this article we shall analyse whether the 
current indexes and the collections of measures which may be built on the basis 
of them can be used for this purpose.
Th e most obvious measure of the political relevance of a given party seems to 
be its size, defi ned either as the number (percentage) of votes gained in the last 
election, or as the number of seats it has in the legislature.10 Th us, the bigger size, 
the higher the relevance. Th is concept is based on the wrong assumption that 
infl uence on authority increases proportionally to the increase in the number of 
seats in parliament. In multi-party systems, however, in which coalition govern-
ments are the norm, the winning subject rarely has the suffi  cient number of seats 
to exercise authority independently. Moreover, the offi  cial winner of the election 
may even be outvoted and be forced to move to the opposition. Even parties which 
do not participate directly in ruling the country, thanks to the fact that they sit in 
parliament, gain a number of instruments and tools for controlling the ruling 
parties and, consequently, they can more or less directly aff ect the direction of state 
policy. It is also diffi  cult to anticipate whether the opposition’s votes will become 
necessary (political blackmail potential), whether because of the increased major-
ity threshold for some parliament’s decisions, a change in the political confi gura-
tion, or the necessity of developing a nationwide consensus in a given issue, etc. 
Th ere are two implications of this situation, which must be taken into consideration 
 9 A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, op.cit., p. 37.
10 R. Herbut, op.cit., p. 168.
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when evaluating the usefulness of diff erent measurement techniques. First, the 
political relevance of a given party does not only result from its size (although it is 
obviously of the key importance in this respect), but from the distribution of 
strength among all parties in parliament and in the whole system. Second, the lack 
of direct involvement in exercising power does not mean having no infl uence on 
authority.
Th e fi rst directive, which demands that the size of other parties be taken into 
account when measuring the size of a given party, which in practice means relativ-
izing its size to the size of competitors, can be implemented with the application 
of a measure, which has oft en been used in empirical political science for making 
diff erent comparisons (especially for comparing the shape and change of format 
of a party system and the degree of its fragmentation over years). It is the index of 
the eff ective number of parties (usually marked with symbol Nz), based on the 
earlier index of fractionalization proposed by Douglas Rae. Th is index was devised 
by a Finnish political scientist Markku Laakso, who developed it later together with 
Reien Taagepera.11 In this case, however, not all parties existing in the system are 
taken into consideration, but only those which are “eff ective,” i.e. the existence of 
which has notable infl uence upon the shape of the political system. Th e eff ective 
number of parties determined by the index means the hypothetical number of 
parties of equal size, which have the same fractionalization eff ect as the one which 
is actually generated by parties of unequal size. If all parties have the same size, the 
value of the index must equal to the number of all parties.12 For example, in 
a 100-seat parliament composed of three parties with the distribution of seats 
51 – 47 – 2, the eff ective number of parties Nz=2.08, which means that this political 
system consists of two big parties and a small one. If the distribution of seats is 
35 – 33 – 32, there will be three such parties (precisely Nz=2.9958), exactly the same 
as in the case of dealing with four parties of more diverse size, e.g. 48 – 23 – 21 – 8.
11 Th e index value is computed in such a way that the summation of squared fractions of the 
votes of all parties (or the seats, depending on whether the index represents the number of parties 
at the electoral or the legislative level) is a divisor for the dividend equal 1. Th e mathematical formula 
is: Nz = 
1
2( )siΣ
, where N denotes the eff ective number of parties and si denotes the party’s fraction of 
the seats. For more details about the index and its characteristics see: M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, 
Eff ective Number of Parties, “Comparative Political Studies” 1979, vol. 12, no. 1; R. Taagepera, Predict-
ing…, pp. 48 – 49; A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, op.cit., pp. 176 – 8.
12 M. Laakso, R. Taagepera, op.cit., pp. 4 – 5.
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Th e eff ective number of parties can identify the number of signifi cant parties in 
the system only if it is based on easy to establish, minimal qualitative data. Accord-
ing to Taagepera, in most cases it is also as precise as a single index based on the 
size of parliamentary factions can be, without detailed knowledge of the charac-
teristics of a given country and the number of relevant parties as defi ned by Sar-
tori.13 Unfortunately, this index does not tell us everything.14 Moreover, its con-
struction may lead to incorrect results. Many fl aws of Nz stem from the fact that it 
oft en overestimates the number of relevant parties, giving too much weight to the 
parties which are completely irrelevant as regards their potential participation in 
the government. Th e index measures each party, taking into account its propor-
tional share in the whole parliament, but it does not really attach enough impor-
tance to the distribution of seats of the other parties and to the resulting coalition 
constellations.15 For example, the index assumes the approximate value of 3 both 
in the case of the relative balance among parties (the distribution of seats 
33 – 34 – 33), a slight advantage of one of them (45 – 29 – 21 – 5), the dominance of 
two relevant parties over twenty marginal ones (48 – 32 – 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1 
– 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1 – 1–1), and the absolute hegemony of one party 
(55 – 7–7 – 7–7 – 7–7 – 3). However, as the size of the fraction of the biggest party 
increases (and the size of others gradually decreases), its relevance potential (coa-
lition or blackmail) also grows. Th is potential is balanced by the fact that (at least 
from the arithmetic point of view) at least one alternative majority coalition is still 
possible. If we use the third example from this paragraph we will notice that both 
the party with 48 seats and the one which has 32 seats need smaller partners for 
obtaining the parliamentary majority (provided that the two parties do not come 
to an agreement). In practice, however, it is easier for the former to gain three 
partners out of 20 than for the latter to win over 19 partners. Th us, it is highly likely 
that the fi rst party will become the hegemon. Th e index of the eff ective number of 
parties becomes even more imprecise when the size of one party is bigger than 
a half, and at the same time we deal with the very big, general fractionalization of 
the party system (see: the last of the above examples of the distribution of seats). 
13 Th is was already recognized by Sartori himself, who tested Rae’s fractionalization index (with 
a few reservations), which is based on the same data and provides the same set of information as Nz, 
but expresses it in a diff erent form. See: op.cit., pp. 271 –2 91.
14 R. Taagepera, Supplementing the eff ective number of parties, “Electoral Studies” 1999, vol. 18, 
no. 4, p. 498.
15 R. Kline, How we count counts: Th e empirical eff ects of using coalitional potential to measure the 
eff ective number of parties, “Electoral Studies” 2009, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 263.
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In such case Nz = 3.0 is simply a mistake.16 Dunleav and Bouçek indicated that the 
index of the eff ective number of parties does not guarantee stable and permanent 
relations between changes of the size of the biggest party and index values. Nz index 
fl uctuates when the fractionalization is low. It oft en has a surprisingly high value 
when the biggest party has a strong position. Using it as a variable which will be 
independent from qualitative analyses may lead to reality distortions, which is 
particularly likely for the countries having plurality voting systems.17
Another problem connected with this index is the fact that it does not diff eren-
tiate the size of a party in relation to the weight of its competitors. If a given party 
has ten seats, its “contribution” to the index will be the same with another party 
having 90 seats and with nine other parties having ten seats each.18 In both cases 
Nz value will obviously be the same (1.22 in the former case and 10.0 in the latter 
one), but the relativization which was mentioned in the fi rst directive occurs at the 
level of the aggregated value of the index rather than of individual parties. It stems 
from the fact that the index of the eff ective number of parties is a measure of the 
party system for the shape of which the number of relevant parties is an important, 
but not the only determinant of its characteristics. Moreover, each party’s strength 
and infl uence on authority is oft en diff erent than the distribution of seats among 
parliamentary factions. In case of a three-party parliament with the distribution 
of seats 49 – 49 – 2, the index has value of 2.08, which implies that there are two big 
parties and the third one of marginal meaning.19 None of these parties, however, 
has enough deputies to rule on its own. Nobody has a majority and each party 
needs the cooperation of one of the others to govern. In this way the real weight 
of each party in our example is exactly the same as they all need each other to form 
a majority coalition, and at the same time it may “tip the scales” in favour of an 
alternative coalition and may change the balance of power among parties, which, 
against the indications of Nz, assumes the two-and-a-half-party character in this 
case. In the language of the public choice theory we may say that each of these 
parties has a position of a “critical” player. Th us, their political relevance is not 
determined by their size (not exclusively), but the degree to which they are indis-
pensable in the process of forming a given majority coalition. In this sense, all 
16 R. Taagepera, Supplementing…, pp. 498 –48 9.
17 P. Dunleavy, F. Bouçek, Constructing the Number of Parties, “Party Politics” 2003, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 307.
18 R. Kline, op.cit., p. 263.
19 We may notice that in this case value Nz is almost identical (the diff erence concern tenths or 
hundredths) as in the example of three parties with the distribution of seats 51 – 47 – 2. However, in 
that case the fi rst party dominates over its competitors thanks to having a majority.
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parties, even the smallest ones, may be as relevant as the large ones.20 Although 
the index of the eff ective number of parties has become one of the most widely 
used measures of the number of parties, partlybecause of its simplicity,21 it is not 
always precise. Rein Taagepera admits that Nz cannot provide accurate information 
about the number of parties which are relevant to the system in case they largely 
diff er in size. It stems from the fact that this index measures centre tendencies and 
works perfectly when all parties are of similar size. Especially in case its value is 
between 2 and 4, it does not provide reliable information about the dominance of 
one party when it has an absolute majority of seats. Th is lack of precision could be 
easily eliminated by introducing the supplementation in the form of a reverse index 
of the biggest faction (N∞). If the value of this index falls below 2.0, it means that 
there is hegemony of one party, which gains over 50% of votes. And vice versa, the 
value above 2.0 indicates that none of the parliamentary parties possesses such 
strength.22
In any event, the index of the eff ective number of parties cannot provide clear 
and precise information about the format of a party system, which was expected 
to be its biggest advantage. Not only is it unable to fully and, more importantly, 
correctly answer the question “How many relevant parties are there?”, but it also 
fails to address the issue of their strength (“How strong is each of them?). Does it 
mean that the attempt to use indexes for examining political relevance have to end 
in failure? Not necessarily, as we may also use power indexes, which have not been 
oft en applied in empirical science, but are well known in the game theory. Th ey 
measure the relative power of voters in collegial bodies under a specifi ed rule of 
settlement (it is usually an absolute majority). Th e Banzhaf power index is an 
example. It is derived by counting, for each member, the number of winning 
coalitions they can participate in, but which are not winning if they do not par-
ticipate. Such voters are referred to as “critical.” Each party’s strength is calculated 
by fi nding for how many winning coalitions a given party is a critical player, which 
means that if it left , the coalition would lose the parliamentary majority needed to 
rule. Th e value obtained is then standardized by being divided by the total number 
of winning coalitions, with the index ranging from 0 (lack of infl uence on any 
20 For more details see: B. Michalak, Partie…, pp. 94 – 95.
21 Such view was expressed by Arend Lijphart. See: A. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party 
Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945 – 1990, Oxford 1994, p. 70.
22 R. Taagepera, Predicting…, p. 62. Th e formula: N∞ = 1 / si, where si denotes the size of the 
biggest parliamentary faction. For more details about the index and its characteristics see: R. Taagep-
era, Supplementing…; R. Taagepera, Predicting…, p. 48.
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coalition) to 1 (having an independent majority). Th e Banzhaf index has fi ve dif-
ferent characteristics which are useful for measuring political relevance. Firstly, it 
does not require collecting any other data than those required by Nz. Secondly, its 
application helps to precisely calculate each party’s ability to sever a given coalition, 
i.e. to establish the degree of its relevance to a given alliance. Th e higher this abil-
ity is, the bigger changes in the system of inter-party relations will take place if 
a party actually uses this possibility. Th is characteristics may be of extreme impor-
tance in the case of measuring the potential for political blackmail, which may be 
used to threaten coalition partners, thanks to which the power of the blackmailing 
party increases. Th irdly, it meets most mathematical postulates required form this 
kind of indexes, including the ones which are key to the issue in the area of our 
interest, and it fully and satisfactorily implements the second directive. Fourthly, 
because of complex and painstaking calculations, especially when there is a large 
number of subjects, precise values may be obtained only by using special compu-
ter programmes, which are relatively easily available for this index. Fift hly, Bz value 
may be successfully used as a parameter for constructing a new index of the eff ec-
tive number of relevant parties (NBz), based on Nz, which will diff er in a way of 
“weighing” parties, but will be recorded in the same form.23 Given the fact that the 
Banzhaf index provides precise information about the likelihood of infl uence on 
the system depending on the weight of the other parties in parliament, its link with 
the criteria for relevance determined by Sartori’s test becomes evident.24
Patrick Daumont and Jean-Francois Caulier25 proposed an index of the eff ective 
number of relevant parties, which is free of the distorting qualities of the Laakso-
Taagepera index and is the most useful tool for measuring the number of relevant 
parties in a system from the point of view of Sartori’s concept. Its mathematical 
notation is almost identical to that of Nz, the only diff erence being that in the 
denominator, instead of the sum of a given party’s squared proportion of seats or 
votes, there is the sum of all parties’ squared individual values Bz of seats. NBz , just 
like Nz, takes into consideration the size of a party, which is the most important 
eff ect of electoral competition, aft er all. What is of the key importance, however, 
is the fact that this index goes one step further as it also takes into account simpli-
fi ed, but useful, aspects of coalition-forming potential. Moreover, it does so 
23 B. Michalak, Partie…, pp. 96 –9 8; R. Kline, op.cit., p. 264.
24 P. Dumont, J.-F. Caulier, Th e Eff ective Number of Relevant Parties. How voting power improves 
Laakso-Taagepera’s index, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17846/; 2005; accessed on August 23, 
2010, pp. 15 – 16.
25 See: ibidem.
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without the need for gathering more data. Th erefore, if we want to fi nd out the 
eff ective number of parties from the point of view of their coalition “profi tability,” 
which is important for the stability of rule, NBz may appear to be the right choice.26 
If we use one of the power indexes presented above, we will be able to assess the 
strength of a given party in relation to the other players on the political scene. 
Despite unquestionable advantages of this approach, it is only “mathematical” 
evaluation of its potential, which does not have to lead to the formation of a real 
coalition. Coalition arrangements are determined by specifi c political circum-
stances and the ideological distance between party groupings. Hence, apart from 
the cases in which the confi guration of all parties’ power (or the lack of it) simply 
forces a certain arrangement (e.g. in case a party has an absolute majority of votes 
or there is no other arithmetic or political alternative to a coalition of certain par-
ties in parliament), competitive alliances are always possible. Power indexes 
measure relevance a priori, which in the political reality does not always translate 
into real infl uence. Th at is why, according to Sartori, the qualitative approach – with 
all its advantages, which make it possible to construct a complete and orderly 
measurement scale – is unable to replace the relevance appraisal based on the 
semantic criterion. For example, it is diffi  cult to establish a precise and universal 
threshold of “dominance,” which enables the identifi cation of all systems with 
a dominant party. In particular, the diff erence between the system in which the 
dominant party has 40% of votes or seats and the one with the biggest party having 
30% of them does not reveal signifi cant implications for the characteristics of the 
whole system. Th e semantic approach, with all its limitations, appears to be a lot 
more useful in theoretical and predictive terms than mathematical techniques.27
On the other hand, the application of mathematical indexes, being the basis of 
the “mechanic approach” as defi ned by Taagepera, is the best solution in case we 
have no other knowledge of the party system we are interested in. What is more, 
this approach makes it possible for us to analyse a large number of cases at a time, 
without having to go through a lot of detailed data andthe resulting threat of getting 
stuck in a multitude of solutions. On this basis, Taagepera refutes Sartori’s criticism, 
claiming that his method of calculating relevant parties is less “operationally useful” 
(in the meaning of intersubjective communicability) than the application of the 
eff ective number of parties.28
26 R. Kline, op.cit., p. 263.
27 G. Sartori, op.cit., p. 282. 
28 R. Taagepera, Predicting…, p. 63.
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If the arguments of the Finnish political scientist are not enough to undermine 
the objections formulated by Sartori, the index of the past coalition potential comes 
in handy. Th is index, denoted as (Ipk), is calculated as a ratio of the coalition cabi-
nets a given party participated in to the total sum of coalition governments formed 
in the period under examination.29 Th e closer to 1.0 the measure is, the higher 
applied potential this party has and vice versa.30  Th us, while power indexes meas-
ure coalition potential a priori, Ipk measures it a posteriori, reducing the limitations 
mentioned above. Of course, we only obtain historical information whether and 
how each party’s mathematical potential translated into their actual ability to form 
a coalition with other subjects. Hence, this is mainly statistical knowledge, and it 
is risky to use it as the basis for making deductions about the future. However, it 
is an inevitable limitation and, as a matter of fact, each causal-eff ect statement 
made by means of inductive reasoning is also risky.
Th e analysis of the relevance of political parties in relation to their size could 
become even more detailed thanks to the application of many additional indexes. 
In this context Alan Siaroff ’s31 extensive empirical research of European party 
systems aft er 1945 is worth mentioning. Th e research involved 372 elections in 44 
countries. Apart from such obvious variables as: the number of votes cast, the 
eff ective number of parties (both at the electoral and the legislative level), the 
degree of fractionalization, disproportionateness and others, the author also used 
the two-party index (a fraction of votes/seats obtained by two biggest parties) and 
a measure based on the ratio of the biggest party in parliament’s seats to the number 
of the second party’s seats (index 1:2) and the ratio of the second to the third one 
(2:3), thanks to which he was able to establish precisely and then compare the 
distance between the parties of the biggest size. Having compared these indicators, 
he built a complete classifi cation of party systems, encompassing all countries 
under research.32
Th e relevance measurement would be incomplete, however, if it was made only 
at the parliamentary level. In fact, each political party’s principal objective is to 
form (on its own or as part of a coalition) the government. A party’s participation 
29 What is interesting, Sartori also came up with an idea of this kind of index for relevant parties 
in the government arena and tested it later. See: G. Sartori, op.cit., pp. 268 –28 9.
30 A. Antoszewski, Partie chadeckie w Europie Zachodniej w latach 1945 – 1998, [in:] Chrześcijańska 
demokracja we współczesnym świecie, K. Krzywicka, E. Olszewski (eds.), Lublin 1999, p. 67.
31 See: A. Siaroff , Comparative European Party Systems. An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections 
since 1945, New York–London 2000.
32 See: ibidem, pp. 27 – 33, 69 – 80.
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in the government may also vary in character, depending on how many ministerial 
portfolios – and the most important post of Prime Minister, in particular – its 
members received, how long this party has been part of the government, and 
whether it played the role of the “initiator” while the government was being formed 
or it only “complemented” it. However, all these important parameters may be 
measured much more easily and without mathematical paradoxes by using the 
indexes ofgovernment relevance. Th e fi rst of them is the index of government 
participation, thanks to which we fi nd out what infl uence a specifi c party had on 
the formation of cabinets in a given period. It is calculated on the basis of two 
dependent variables: the number of governments established with the participation 
of the party under research divided by the sum of all cabinets formed during that 
time.33 Th e value of such indicator ranges from 0 – the party has never taken part 
in any government – to 1, when each cabinet was formed with its participation. 
Analogically to Ipi, the index of government responsibility (I0) – which measures 
the extent to which a given party controlled the post of Prime Minister in the 
period under research – may be constructed. Th e application of this index – apart 
from obtaining additional information – allows us to overcome the limitations of 
the previous measure, which does not take into account the fact that the strength 
(thus relevance, as well) of parties composing government coalitions varies and 
treats each cabinet in the same way no matter whether a party played the initiating 
or complementary role in it. Th ere is no doubt that the party which has always 
headed the government is, by principle, more relevant than the one who has always 
been in the role of a weaker coalition partner. In order to conduct an even more 
thorough analysis, we may also apply the chronometric relevance index (Ic). It is 
calculated by dividing the number of months (or years) in which a given party 
participated in the government by the total number of months (years) in the period 
under research. On the basis of the information obtained by means of all three 
indexes we may carry out the multidimensional evaluation of the relevance of all 
parties in the government arena by using the so-called combined or multidimen-
sional index, built through mixing (usually in equal proportions) the other indexes 
of government relevance and reducing them to one common indicator. Such 
operation is particularly useful for comparing the relevance of many political par-
33 It may be illustrated by the following formula, where Ipi denotes the index of government 
relevance for party i,Pi is the number of cabinets in which it participated, Gis the total number of 
cabinets formed in a given period: Ip Gi
Pi= .
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ties from diff erent countries throughout years as it reduces the number of compa-
rable data, which makes it much easier to analyse them later.34
* * *
Although only the most important indexes have been discussed in the article 
and their analysis could not be very detailed, their characteristics show that, despite 
fears or criticism from some scholars, political science has a wide set of research 
tools for conducting precise measurements of empirical data, which are useful for 
making comparisons. Many of them may be well applied to comparative studies 
carried out especially in the fi eld of party and electoral systems. What I wanted to 
put special emphasis on in this article is the problem of the application of some of 
these tools for analysing the phenomenon of political relevance. I tried to show 
that, in defi ance of the scepticism expressed by the author of this concept, the 
operationalization and then the measurement of this phenomenon is absolutely 
possible, even without the need for developing new tools. It appears that mathe-
matically well-founded indexes, which are well-known in political science, may 
help to answer the question how many relevant parties there are in a given system 
and how much relevant they are. Although in the course of this analysis it turned 
out that one of the most popular indexes, i.e. the index of the eff ective number of 
parties, cannot be used for this purpose – both because of the imperfections of 
measurement and because of its construction, which makes it impossible to com-
pare relevance between individual parties – the application of power indexes fully 
eliminates this problem. Moreover, thanks to correlating them with relevance 
indexes a posteriori, it becomes possible to quantify Sartori’s relevance criteria. 
What plays a crucial part here is the mathematical inventiveness of Taagepera, who 
in an admirably simple way tries to fi nd an algorithm which will identify the rela-
tions between the concepts developed by Sartori on the one hand, and between 
them and the index of the eff ective number of countries on the other.35
34 For more details see: A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Socjaldemokracja w Europie Zachodniej. 
Studium porównawcze, Wrocław 1995, pp. 137 – 40, 147 –14 8, 151; R. Herbut, op.cit., pp. 201 –20 3; 
A. Antoszewski, op.cit., p. 63.
35 Th us, according to this scholar, the relation between the total number of relevant parties (R) 
and the number of relevant parties in the government arena (G), with a few exceptions, is expressed 
by the formula: R = G + 1.5. In turn, the formula for the relation between G and the eff ective number 
of parties (N) is: G = N – 1. Hence, as a result R = Nz – 0,5. Of course, as the author emphasizes himself, 
these are only approximate values. See: R. Taagepera, Predicting…, p. 64.
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As can be seen, we have specialist tools which enable us to measure relevance. 
However, does it justify the thesis that there exists a comprehensive method of exam-
ining this phenomenon. If a method is defi ned as a tool of theoretically justifi ed 
conceptual and practical eff orts encompassing all the activities performed in the 
course of a research procedure, then, in my opinion, in this case it is a method, which, 
on account of the kind of a measurement technique used, may be called the “index” 
method. Th e theoretical concept of relevance together with its qualitative “test,” 
combined with appropriately selected and confi gured quantitative techniques, guar-
antees not only the eff ective measurement of this phenomenon, but also the possibil-
ity of using it as a basis for building a unifi ed scale at the ordinal, or even interval level. 
Owing to this, it becomes easier to compare both the number of relevant parties in 
specifi c party systems, but also the degree of its intensity for given parties. Some 
research examples36 show that such approach may also appear to be fruitful.
36 A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Socjaldemokracja…; R. Herbut, op.cit., pp. 201 –2 16; A. Antosze-
wski, op.cit.; B. Michalak, Partie…
